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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY,
a corporation

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MRS. HELEN SHEEHAN ARTHUR
and
MRS. GLENERA SHEEHAN HUNTER,

Case No.
9123

vs.
NICK CHOURNOS and wife,
vs.
MILTON A. OMAN et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT HELEN SHEEHAN ARTHUR

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The above entitled three cases were, as stated by the
appellant, consolidated for trial before- the District Court of
Box Elder County, Utah. I am the attorney for Helen Sheehan
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Arthur, one of the respondents Civil No. 8071. Each proceeding
is in eminent domain wherein Southern Pacific filed a suit
to condemn gravel fill material from certain lands owned by
the respondents. My client owns one half {Vz) interest in
approximately fifteen thousand {15,000) acres of land on
Promontory, which includes the North half of Section 1 and
the South half of Section 2, T. 6. N., R 6. W. S. L. M. The
material was sought for the purpose of re-location and construction of appellant's main line running across Great Salt
Lake westerly from Promontory Point in Box Elder County,
State of Utah. The appellant, in order to obtain said gravel
and fill material also sought to condemn an easement over the
properties of the respondents described in appellant's complaint, or a right of entry thereon for a period of three ( 3)
years and then asked for an order of immediate occupancy
which was granted October 22nd, 1957. Appellant proceeded
evidently under Section 78-34-2 {3), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which is:
nThe right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands,
with the right to take therefrom such earth, gravel,
stones, trees and timber as may be necessary for some
public use."
Respondent sought to obtain the market value of the gravel
and fill material taken and severance damage. The severance
damage was caused by the appellant making huge excavations
in the middle of resp~ndent' s range lands and particularly in
places on the lands where sheep, when using the range for
fall and winter pasture, must of necessity travel back and forth
from the high to the low lands in order to utilize the range.
The excavations, as left by appellant, created barriers which
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divide the range, spoil its use and make it less attractive to
new tenants who might seek range pasture in the future.
Little Valley, which will be mentic;>ned considerably 1n
the record, must be described in ·the interests of showing the
problem that is peculiar to the respondents in this case. The
Promontory peninsula extends from the North out into Great
Salt Lake. It is on the west side and between three and a half
to four miles north of the Southerly point of the peninsula
from where the railroad line runs westerly across the lake
"
that the appellant established its work camp called !(Little
Valley Camp." The camp itself was located in Section 11,
T. 6 N., R. 6 W. S.L.M., and within a quarter of a mile of
the lake shore on the westerly side. It was laid out on flat
open plain that increased in elevation as you traveled easterly.
Also, immediately to the east and slightly to the North of the
camp, two steep hills or ranges of land run Easterly forming
a canyon in between and as you proceeded East through the
canyon these hills separated and formed a valley. The hill on
the right, as you traveled East, turned Southerly until you
reached near the center of Section 8, T. 6 N., 5 W. S.L.M.,
(Tr. 224) then turned back Northerly in a twisting fashion,
passing South of the center of Section 4 and going on Northerly
within a quarter of a mile of the East side of Section 3 3 in
the township to the North, then Northwesterly toward the
center of Section 29, thence Southwesterly toward the South
side of Section 31, thence Westerly through Section 36, T. 7 N.,
R. 6. W. S.L.M., where it becomes the left hill as you enter
the canyon East of the camp site. ·The valley that these hills

~:

r~

I

form is known as !(Little Valley" and the floor of this valley
c

increases in elevation as you travel East and North from the
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camp site. The only water in this valley was along the Easterly
mountains on the foot-hills on the Hunter-Arthur property
(Tr. 225). It was not too dependable and when the sheep
could not pick up water from snow or the natural feed (Tr.
22 5) they had to go west, ~own through the canyon to the
lake shore where there were springs (Tr. 225). There were
established roads and trails from the West shore East into the
valley (Tr. 227). The weather conditions on the East side
of the promontory were more severe in the winter time and
the snow laid differently in the Little Valley than on the
East side (Tr. 227). The Little Valley itself, with its natural
lay of the land, made it possible for the sheep to drift from
the high lands to· the low lands on the West lake shore line
when the weather was bad and then ~ack up when the ~eather
cleared, all in a natural manner with great protection (Tr.
227). When the cuts were made by the appellant the big
conveyor belts were placed right in the canyon of ttLittle Valley"
and the materials were taken from one side across to the
other and for great distances up through it. After the taking
was finished the appellant had taken approximately, from all
sources, 44 million cubic yards of fill (Tr. 303). They left the
banks steep and dangerous so as to be a great hazard to livestock (Tr. 164-5). The appellant made no attempt to level
out the sides of the cut and the jury was taken out and given
a view of the premises which showed vertical sides varying
from a few feet in height in some places to ten or twenty times
that in others. This great hole in the entrance to Little Valley
literally divided· up the use that a livestock man could ever
make of the area (Tr. 162-166). When this problem was
approached in the course of the trial, that is, either severance
8
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damage that the excavation had caused to the range, or damage
which might result to the owner in costs in leveling out the
steep banks so as to remove the hazard to the livestock (Tr.
167-168), the court insisted that an election must be made,
that we could not have both forms of damage, and said:
nTHE COURT: If you want severance damage, then
the cost of pushing down the banks becomes immaterial. If you want the cost of fixing that so the sheep
can go down there, why, you can pursue that. But I
question that you can have both of them. In fact, I'll
require you to ·elect." (Tr. 168, line 11-15).
As a consequence the respondents elected to pursue their
right to severance damages and abandoned their efforts to
make proof of the cost of restoration of the sides of the gravel
pits so as to remove the hazard and danger to livestock.
Now in regard to the gravel itself. Appellant's own witness
testified that the appellant itself owned a gravel pit on the
very point of the promontory where the railroad crosses (Tr.
306) located in Section 28, T. 6. N., R. 5 W., but did not
want to use that because of the distance. He also said (Tr.
304) that they looked at other areas than those chosen that
were at distances farther away varying more than a mile, but
they picked these particular locations (Tr. 305) because of
location and quality of material.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POIN'T I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF
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CERTAIN .WITNESSES OF RESPONDENTS AS TO THE
VALUE OF THE GRAVEL AND FILL MATERIAL TAKEN
B·Y APPELLANT; AND IN RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE
THE RESPONDENTS' EXHIBIT 2 SHOWING OTHER
GRAVEL SALES.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO THE JURY THE
QUESTION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES, AND BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN TESTIMONY
PERTAINING THERETO.

(a) THE FACTS OF THIS PARTICULAR CASE AND
THE PHYSICAL MAKEUP OF LITTLE VALLEY AND
ITS PARTICULAR USE IN CONNECTION WITH
DEFENDANTS' OTHER LANDS WAS PROOF OF
ITSELF THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER SIMILAR
LANDS AVAILABLE.

(b) THE DAMAGES TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES WERE FROM APPELLANT'S
OPERATIONS UPON LANDS OWNED BY RESPONDENTS AND THEIR RIGHT OF ENTRY
THEREON.

(c) THE SO-CALLED ~~SEVERANCE'' DAMAGES
TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES
CONSISTED OF DAMAGES THAT WOULD RESULT
TO AN OWNER IN THE USE OF HIS LAND IN
LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS ·oR TO AN OWNER IF
10
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HE ATTEMPTED TO LEASE THE LANDS FOR A
LIVESTOCK OPERATION BY THE LANDS BEING
LESS DESIRABLE OR USEABLE TO A TENANT.
(d) RESPONDENTS' DAMAGES WERE NOT ARRIVED AT BY ADDING ·THE VALUES OF DIFFERENT USES FOR THE LAND TAKEN.

(e) RESPONDENTS DID PRESENT

EVIDENCE OF THE MARKET VALUE OF THEIR
REMAINING LANDS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN
DAMAGED.

(f) THE TESTIMONY DOES ESTABLISH SEVERANCE DAMAGE OF RESPONDENTS' LANDS AS
THAT TERM IS CONTEMPLATED AND USED IN
THE COURT DECISIONS AND THE STATUTES.

POINT III

~~.:

'

COMPETEN1~

)'..'~

THE VERDICT IS NO~f EXCESSIVE NOR THE RESULT OF PREJUDICE OF THE JURY, BUT IS IN KEEPING WITH THE 'TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES OF
BOTH THE APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS.

:f.
1l:
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF
CERTAIN WITNESSES OF RESPONDENTS AS TO THE
VALUE OF THE GRAVEL AND FILL MATERIAL TAKEN
BY APPELLANT; AND IN RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE
THE RESPONDENTS' EXHIBIT 2 SHOWING OTHER
GRAVEL SALES.

POINT III
THE VERDICT IS NOT EXCESSIVE NOR THE RESULT OF PREJUDICE OF THE JURY, BUT IS IN KEEPING WITH THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES OF
BOTH THE APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS.
Counsel for the appellant takes the peculiar position that
unless the defendants could present evidence of market value
of the property taken at the exact place of taking, that our
hands are then tied and we have no alternative but to accept
the unconscionable offer made by the appellant ,of 2/lOths of
a cent a cubic yard for the material that they might want.
12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gravel pits or gravel deposits throughout the State of
Utah have a definite and fixed value of between one and onehalf cents to fifteen cents per yard, but the market for a particular gravel pit generally depends upon a demand being
created in a particular locality caused by construction of some
kind, sometimes roads, sometimes industries and sometimes
from other sources and any particular gravel pit or deposit
is made marketable generally because of two or three different
things, and this was set out in particular by one of respondents'
witnesses, Douglas J. Fife, who has been in the general contracting and sand and gravel business for thirty years (Tr. 64
line 12) and during that time has had occasion to bid on many
public work jobs. He was asked the question:

t!Q. What makes a pit desirable, Mr. Fife, for construction work?
A. Well, of course, the demand. If they're building
a new road through a section of country and there are
no pits available, we go· out and prospect and find
pits, and then negotiate with the owner to buy_ the
material.

Q. What do you look for in locating those? What is
the desire in regard to accessibility or grades or types
of formation of the sand?
A. Well, of course, vve generally look for gravel
and we try to find a pit as close to the project as possible
to cut down the haul. (Tr. 65, lines 2-13).
Mr. Jack Parsons, another witness for. the respondents,
is in the sand and gravel business both at Smithfield, Cache
County, Utah, and Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah,
and has been in the busjness for 25 years. He testified that
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the course of time he had opened up many gravel pits (Tr.
132 line 18) and he was asked the following:

t(Q. What makes a gravel pit valuable to you as a
contractor?
A. I'd say location, quantity and quality and probably
accessibility." (Tr. 133 line 6).
He was asked further questions as follows:
~~Q.

Does the gravel become more valuable per cubic
yard the closer you can get it to your project?
A. Right.

Q. Is that because of the haul problem?
A. Yes, the haul would be lessened and the gravel
itself wouldn't be any more valuable, but the cost in
producing it would be less." (Tr. 133 lines 18-24).
He was then asked this question as follows:

(CQ. And you consider this of an average quality.
Now, do you have an opinion as to what the fair reasonable market value was, as of the 22nd day of October,
1957, per cubic yard in place, of the gravel that was
in the north pits? You can answer that <eyes" or "no"
whether you have an opinion.
A. I do not have an opinion.

Q. As to what its value was?
A. No, I have an opinion of what I've paid for
material similar on my own projects, but to place a
value there, I wouldn't have an opinion.
Q. _I'll ask yo~ this w~y. What have y~u paid for
matertal of stmtlar quahty on your own projects."
(Tr. 135 lines 2-13).
14
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Mr. O'Conner at that point wanted to voir dire the witness
and asked him this question:

"Q. Where is that other material located?
A. Well, I have seventeen miles of interstate highway going approximately forty miles to the north of
our said exhibit at the present time, and that is similar
material.

Q. You mean you're selling gravel to a project some
forty miles to the north of this pit; is that it?

A. I'm not selling it. I'm buying it. That is a state
highway." (Tr. 135 lines 24-30).
The court allowed him to ansv1er as follows:
nTHE COURT: Just give us a figure, Mr. Parson.
A. Two cents a yard." (Tr. 136, line 17).

He was then asked if he had other projects going on throughout the State of Utah where he had purchased fill 1naterial of
similar kind and grade and again Mr. O'Conner, attorney for
appellant, sought to question him on voir dire and asked
him where the jobs were located, as follows:

CCA. Well, from Smithfield north, one project and
Grantsville west. There are two projects there.
Q. Was the source of the material close to the job
on those two ?
A. Yes.
Q. How far away approximately?
A. Oh, probably four or five hundred yards from
the highway.

MR. O'CONNER: I see. Go ahead.
BY MR. MANN:

15
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Q. And what did you pay for those?
A. The lowest was a cent and a half and the highest
I think about eight cents." (Tr. 137 lines 4-14).
He was then asked again, as follows:

ceQ. But you have used fill material then between one
and a half to eight cents ?
A. Right." (Tr. 138 lines 11-13).
and of course he had already testified that they were of the
same kind and quality and quantity as that that the appellant
was seeking to take.
On re-direct examination he was asked again, as follows:

ceQ. Mr. Parson, isn't it a fact that any gravel pit that
you have opened up for construction work, there was
not a market for that particular gravel until your project
came into being ?
A. Right.
Q. And when the job came into being, then there
was· a demand for gravel in the locality?
A. That's right.

Q. And that created an immediate market for it?
A. Right." (Tr. 141 lines 4-12).
At the close of the testimony of Mr. Parsons (Tr. 143)
it was called to the court's attention that we had a Mr. Hunsaker
and a Mr. Germer, both contractors using sand and gravel,
and that their testimony would be similar to that of Mr. Parsons
and counsel for appellant and myself both stipulated that they
would testify similar to Mr. Parsons, and the court said:
uTHE COURT: You understand that. If Mr. Germer
and Mr. Hunsaker were called, he'd testify the same
as Mr. Parsons." (Tr. 143 lines 9-11).
16
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Now, Mr. Fife, who was called (Tr. 68 line 2) testified
that the average market value in his opinion was five cents per
cubic yard. Melbourne Ford, who \vas called as a respondents'
witness, who was also a general contractor and had been in
the business since 1948 (Tr. 89 line 28) at Provo, Utah, (Tr.
100 line 21) testified that the material taken by the appellant
was worth five cents per yard. J. Gibbons of the firm of Gibbons
and Reed Construction Company ( T r. 41 line 21) testified
that in his opinion (Tr. 46 line 3) that the material was
worth five cents per cubic yard. Lee E. Young, an employee
of the State Land Board (Tr. 118 line 13), who had been
employed for a period of ten years as manager, executive
secretary and director) and also as Chief Land Examiner, stated
(Tr. 118 line 27) that his duties were land management, land
appraisement, land sales, land acquisition and mineral and
surface leasing, and he testified (Tr. 119 line ·16) about the
. Promontory gravel:
nA. Well, I was there on a gravel inspection in July
of 1955."
He further testified that he had received an application to
·lease gravel on Section 36, T. 7 N., R 6. W. S.L.M., which is
the section just adjacent to the Hunter-Arthur lands that were
condemned by the appellant. He said that one J. P. Underwood of Ogden (Tr. 120 line 20) was seeking to make a
gravel lease upon this section and that he· found gravel deposits
on it. He was asked about the lease as follows:

,

((Q. And in regard to lease on section thirty-six, was
that leased at the minimum or maximum ?
A. The minimum for gravel.

17
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Q. And can you tell us why this was leased at the
minimum?
A. For the reason that it isn't too accessible and
there is a lot of waste on the section. Accessibility isn't
nearly as available as the adjacent lands in that vicinity.
Some of the adjacent lands." (Tr. 123 lines 2-9).
He then testified that it was leased to the individual for one
and a half cents per cubic yard and the lease entered into.
He further testified (Tr. 127 line 1) that they have leases
entered into by their office as high as fifteen cents per yard
for gravel.
Mr. O'Conner stated on his openmg statement to the
jury as follows:
Much of our case has been presented by the
witnesses for the defendant; that is through parts where
I cross examined and their own answers. . . . " (Tr.
247 lines 18-21).
t t

•

•

•

Counsel for the respondents feels that Mr. O'Conner's statement is true, that he made his case and in doing so also made
the case for the respondents. The court's attention is called to
the fact that on his cross examination and when he was cross.
examining J. R. Gibbons ( T r. 49 line 21) in regard to the
cost of removing or transporting the gravel, he asked the
question:

·ttQ. Is seven cents a ton mile sound reasonable?"
And again to the same witness he said:

t(Q. Now,

if the truck rate is even five cents a ton

mile-that is, five cents for every ton hauled a mile
from Promontory Point to any market-wouldn't that
make the purchase of it at this five cents a yard pro18
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hibitive as far as competing with the Brigham City
market?" (Tr. 51-lines 3-7).
In his cross examination of Douglas
of hauling per ton mile, it states:

J.

fife, about the cost

~~A.

Well, you might get it hauled for six cents, but
I think your figure of seven cents is a good figure.''
(Tr. 71 lines 19-20).
On his cross examination of Melbourne Ford, asking about
hauling costs:
nA. I'd say fron1 five to seven cents a ton mile."
(Tr. 110 line 21).
All of which impressed the jury of the value of having the
material as accessible as possible. Then when its own witness,
Denny Reynolds Bagley, the project engineer, took the stand,
he testified under direct examintion that the value per cubic
yard of materials taken from the Chournos and Hunter-Arthur
properties was :
nA. Two mills per cubic yard." (Tr. 300 line 19).
On cross examination he was asked the ratio of two mills
to five cents and he told the jury it was 1-25 (Tr. 302). He
had testified that he had bought some gravel during the
construction from the Fife Sand and Gravel Company at
Brigham City, and had paid $1.35. He was asked the comparison between t\\'0 mills and $1.3 5 and he said it was
about 1-600 (Tr. 302 lines 14 and 15). He was asked if he
checked the pit area to make sure it met the qualifications
necessary to make the road bed fill ( Tr. 302) and he said it
was suitable and desirable for their needs. He was asked if
he had checked other areas for the purpose of satisfying their
19
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needs and he advised (Tr. 304 line 13) that he had checked
areas South and East and that they were at greater distances
bearing up to a lit~le over a mile further in distance.
Consequently, I say in all earQ.estness, that when Mr.
O'Conner brought out from nearly each and every one of
our witnesses that the haulage cost of gravel was seven cents
a mile that he, through his own efforts, impressed upon the
jury that because of the location of out pits and their accessibility that there was a consideration that any buyer would
give if he sought to purchase from a willing seller. He was then
asked about why they picked these pits and he said:

c'A. They were picked because of the combination
of location and quality." (Tr. 305 lines 5 and 6).
Later on, on re-cross examination by Mr. Oman, Mr. Bagley
was asked (Tr. 306 line 10) if Southern Pacific, the appellant,
did not have a gravel pit just north of the old Promontory
Station and he admitted that they did. He was asked why
they did not take the gravel from that location and he advised
(Tr. 306 line 22) because of the distance. Mr. O'Conner
had played on distance and costs and again I say that the
location and quality of material on respondents' land, together
with their availability to any purchaser either now or in the
immediate future was impressed upon the jury by Mr. O'Conner.
The courts are, of necessity, given wide discretion in
placing limits on the extent to which other comparable sales
are admissible in evidence for the purpose of establishing a
market value (see Ramming Real Estate Co. vs. United States,
122 F2d 892 (8th Cir. 1941); Forest Preserve Dist. vs. Dra20
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per, 387 Ill. 149, 56 N.E. 2nd 410 ( 1944); In re Edward J.
Jeffries Homes Housing Project, 306 Mich. 638, 11 N.W.
2d 272 (1943).
The case of State of Utah vs. Peek, 265 P .2d 630, 1 Utah
2d 263 ( 1953), has been referred to and quoted on page 17
of the appellant's brief; however, the quotation is incomplete and not fully understood without the remaining portion
of the quoted paragraph being given, which portion is as
follows:
HThis is a. preliminary question for the trial judge
to determine before such evidence is admissible, and
his determination should be followed by the appellate
court in the absence of an abuse of discretion. It is also
within the sound discretion of the trial judge to limit
the amount of such evidence in the interest of avoiding
confusion of the issues and the undue consumption of
time." (I Utah 2d page 273).
Another case in point is Baetjer vs. United States, 143
F.2d 391, 397 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 324 U.S. 772 ( 1944):
((The questions of whether such transactions are near
enough in time, or involve substantially similar lands,
or significant amounts of land are all questions of the
remoteness of the evidence offered and in consequence
are for the trial court.''
In 20 C.J. page 777, under a title ((Special Value to Taker
and Adaptability to Purpose for Which Taken," the article
says that we do not attempt, in condemnation proceedings,
to have the value fixed on a basis of benefit which the property
, may be to the other party to the proceedings, but gives the
exception, which is:
. . The true rule is that any use for which the
21
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property is capable may be considered, and if ~he ~an~
has an adaptability for the purposes f~r wh1c~ 1t 1s
taken, the owner may have this. cons1dered 1n the
estimate as well as any other use for which it is capable." (See cases cited thereunder) .
Following this same theory in 29 C.J.S. on page 1028 we have,
under ((Special Value to Taker and Adaptability to Purpose
for Which Taken'' as follows:
nAs stated supra Art. 136, compensation must be
reckoned fron1 the standpoint of what the landowner
loses by having his property taken, not by the benefit
which the property may be to the other party to the
proceedings; therefore the value of the parcel to the
condemnor, or the need of acquiring the particular
parcel for the proposed improvement, or the value
that would accrue to the land from the construction
of the contemplated improvement, cannot be considered
as an element of damage to the land owner; neither
can an amount that has at some time been expended
on the property in question, which has rendered it
specially suitable for the use for which it is being
condemned, be claimed by the landowner, but such
improvements may be considered in so far as they
enhance the value of the property. The rule that the
value of the property to the condemnor is not to be
considered does not mean that the adaptability of the
land taken for the purposes of the condemnor may
not be considered, along with any other uses for which
the land is available, in detern1ining its market value,
provided the prospective demand for such use of the
land by prospective purchasers or condemnors affects
the present market value of the land.''
There are many cases cited under this, two of which I
wish to discuss. One is aCalifornia case, Ten1escal Water Co.
vs. Marvin, 9 P2d 335. ··rhis was an action by a water com-
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pany to condemn a reservotr site for the impounding of
water and two hydraulic engineers testified. It appears from
the evidence that they tried to testify and fix value to the
condemnor according to his particular benefits, but not strictly
market value and the court properly pointed out that the
question was not what the property was worth to the person
intending to acquire it, by condemnation, but it did state what
could have been offered. On page 337, right hand column, it
said:
" ... The jury had a right to consider the fact, in
determining the market value, that the land in controversy was in proximity to a dam-site, and to consider its adaptability for reservoir purposes and to
determine whether or not its market value had been
enhanced by improvements put upon adjoining property; . . . "
The court then went on to discuss a prior decision, being
City of Stockton vs. Ellingwood, 275 P. 228, and in the right
hand column, page 239, it said:
((In determining values in actions of eminent domain,
where, for certain purposes, the lands are extreme! y
valuable, and for other and different purposes are of
little or no value, courts are confronted with many
difficulties, the chief of which is sometimes the apparent fact that there is no market value, in the strict
sense of the word, but that this does not entitle a
plaintiff to take the lands sought to be condemned
without paying just compensation."
And the court again, quoted from Spring Valley Water-Works
vs. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 28 P.682:
The question is thus presented whether, assuming that the land sought to be taken was specially
cc

•••

23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

valuable for the purpose named, it was relevant and
competent to show such value. There is undoubtedly
some conflict in the authorities as to the admissibility
of questions put in this form; but we think the point
was decided in favor of the admissibility of such evidence in the case of Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78
Cal. 63, 20 Pac. Rep. 372, and in the same case on
a second appeal to this court, 88 Cal. 50, 25 Pac. Rep.
977 ( 11 L.R.A. 604) . . . "
Another very interesting case also cited in the footnotes
last referred to in 29 C.J.S. page 1028 is the Union Exploration Company vs. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, 89
P2d 2 57, a Colorado case. In this particular action it was very
necessary that
tunnel for the carrying of a railroad and
water through the Continental Divide be made. The plaintiff
went into possession of the property on an agreement providing that third parties would attempt to negotiate the value
to be paid for the timber and easement. When the negotiators
could not arrive at an acceptable solution, the action was
commenced and considered one in eminent domain to determine
how much would be paid to the Union Exploration Company.
This is a lengthy decision with many cases cited. The testimony
involved a great difference in values, such as one person's
testimony of $10.00 per acre as against the experts' testimony
of a total of $357,000.00. And the court, in the right hand
columt?- page 261, said:

a

nThe present situation of the defendant's land is
out of the ordinary. In determining the value of its
lands, or the value to be paid it, it is difficult to find
any precedent or any rule that can be applied. If we
were to assume that the land is only valuable for pasture, or for timber purposes, the amount could be
found in a very simple way, but when we have to con24
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sider all of the facts and circumstances, and fix the
value to this property, for all reasonable purposes,
it is difficult under the testimony offered to apply any
of the known rules of law in fixing values . . . ''
Starting on the right hand column, page 262, in the case case,
we have:
" ( 4-6) Defendant's counsel contend that ((The most
profitable and advantageous use to which the property
is adapted is the basis upon which fair compensation
should be determined.'' We think this proposition is
correct. Section 17, Chapter 61, '35 C.S.A. Cases to
this effect could be cited without number. We call
attention to a few mentioned in defendant's brief:
Colorado M. Ry Co. v. Brown, 15 Colo. 193, 25. P.87;
Denver & R.G.R.R. Co., v. Griffith, 17 Colo. 598, 31
P. 171; Denver, N.W. & P.R. Co. v. Howe, 49 Colo.
256, 112 P. 779; Scurvin Ditch Co. v. Roberts, 58 Colo.
533, 146 P. 233; Wassenrich v. Denver, 67 Colo. 456,
186 P. 533, 53 7 ...
((We call attention also to Harrison v. Young, 9
Ga. 359, and Young v. Harrison, 17 Ga. 30. In its
opinion in the latter case the court "'said: ((It is not
difficult to see that such prospective value of a piece
of ground might be its chief element of value to its
owner. An owner of land, peculiarly situated by reason
of its proximity to some great city or great work of
internal improvement, may look into the future and
see t~at it will, at some distant day, become extremely
valuable by reason of its situation, and that none other
can be procured for the purpose for which he anticipates that it will be needed. He desires, accordingly,
to keep it, knov:ing that it will be a fine property for
his children, if not for himself. If deprived of that
property for public purposes, and especially for the
benefit, at the same time, of a private company, can
he have (just compensation' unless reference is had
25
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to the prospective value of the land, and unless that is,
to some extent at least, taken into account?"
In Mississippi & R. River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98
U. S. 403, 407, 25 L. Ed. 206, speaking with respect
to compensation the court laid down the following
rule: C(In determining the value of land appropriated
fo~ public purposes, the same considerations are to be
regarded as in a sale of property between private parties. The inquiry in such cases must be what is the
property worth in the market, viewed not merely with
reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied,
but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly
adapted; that is to say, what is it worth from its
availability for valuable uses. Property is not to be
deemed worthless because the owner allows it to go
to waste, or to be regarded as valueless because he
is unable to put it to any use. Others may be able to
use it, and make it subserve the necessities, or conveniences of life. Its capability of being made thus
available gives it a market value which can be readily
estimated.
So many and varied are the circumstances to be
taken into account in determining the value of property
condemned for public purposes, that it is perhaps
impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will
modify the most carefully guarded rule; but, as a
general thing, we should say that the compensation
to the owner is to be ·estimated by reference to the uses
for which the property is suitable, having regard to
the existing business or wants of the comn1unity, or
such as n1ay be reasonably expected in the immediate
future."
cc

ccin Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Gage,"286
Ill. 213, 121 N. E. 582, 587, the Supreme Court stated
the rule as follows: ccThe owner of land appropriated
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for a public use is entitled to its value for the most
profitable use for which it is available, and a capacity
for a future use which may be anticipated with reasonable certainty, though dependent upon circumstances
which may possibly never occur is competent to be
shown and considered by the jury in fixing the compensation if the capacity for such use in fact enhances
the market value of the land ought to be taken in its
present condition and state of improvement."
In summing this up it is quite apparent that we have this
situation. The respondents offered testimony that throughout
the State of Utah for any gravel pits that have b~en opened
up, and some were within forty miles immediately north and
others less than twenty miles, just across the Promontory
Point in Ogden, and one immediately adjacent to the lands
taken, that the price varied from one cent where the State
Land Board dealt with the State Road Commission being
the lowest figure, up to as high as fifteen cents for gravel
of similar kind and quantity and quality, with the state
minimum royalty to individuals or private corporatio~s of
one and one-half cents. When we compare this with the two
tenths of a cent testified to by witnesses of the appellant,
appellant's figure appears all out of reason. It was also shown
that the appellant itself had other quantities of gravel right
on Promontory Point, rea.dily accessible for it, that it chose
to condemn the lands of the respondents for the purpose of
taking the gravel fill because of the location, quantity and
quality of the materials sought to be condemned, or, in other
words, the adaptability of this particular gravel deposit. If
it were convenient and adaptable to appellant, it also had that
same convenience and adaptability to any other individual
that might wish to purchase in the future and ship to other
27
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points. The testimony also shows that the appellant laid great
stress on the cost of hauling gravel. All of which no doubt
impressed the jury as to the adaptability of the respondents'
supply. The price determined by the jury of three cents per
cubic yard shows that they did not fix the price based on
appellant's needs or its value to it, or it would certainly have
been higher than the cost of hauling of a ton mile of seven
cents because their nearest other source was more than a mile
away. They did not reach the figure shown in any exhibit
that the appellant, with tongue in cheek, says was prejudicial
error to admit, nor did they go down to the unconscionable
figur,e that appellant claimed. But, by the weight of all the
testimony, the jury fixed the fair, reasonable market value of
the gravel per cubic yard in place for its wonderful adaptability
for a gravel pit.
When I say the appellant, with tongue in cheek, talks
about prejudicial error or reversible error, I would like, for
just one moment, to go into the testimony of the witness
Dell Adams, offered by appellant in support of its contention
of two tenths of a cent per cubic yard. Dell Adams was put
on the stand as a witness for appellant, in the absence of a
jury (Tr. 307 line 11), to determine the admissibility of his
testimony. After considerable testimony to the effect that the
contract for the purchase of the n1aterials from him at twotenths of a cent per yard not only covered the taking of the
material but covered all severance damage and the leaving
of the holes from which the material w~s removed in the
exact condition they would be in after the material was taken,
etc., counsel for the respondents moved (Tr. 317 line 2):
28
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HMR. MANN: If it please the court, we move that
the evidence be not admitted. The witness has now
testified that it is not only for the price of gravel but
it's for the damage done to the severance of the land
and of every kind, and we have a Utah case that specifically sets out that if the price includes the purchase
price and the damage, that it cannot be offered, and
that's that case I cited to you."
After further argument, Mr. Adams was brought back before
the jury (Tr. 326) and the court allowed him to proceed to
offer in his contract (Tr. 330 line 25). He officially offered
it at that time and before the court ruled on it, I asked to voir
dire Mr. Adams (Tr. 331 line 11 to page 332 line 19):
nBY MR. MANN:

Q. Mr. Adams, in your discussions w~th these people
and for the taking of 56,000,000 cubic yards, did you
discuss that they would have to dig this yardage out
of your lands?
A. That's all I could sell them was my lands.

Q. Yes. And that they would dig huge holes in
taking it out in order to satisfy the .requirement of your
contract of 56,000,000 yards?
A. That's right.

Q. And did the price that you agreed on in this contract for taking out this 56,000,000 yards take care of
all of the dirt taken out as well as the holes that might
be dug upon your land and the leaving of your land,
when they finished, with the holes in place without
filling it back in any way?
A. That's right.

Q. Did you at that time consider that when they
would pay you the sum specified in the contract, that
29
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it would be payment in full of the purchase price and
any damage done to your lands and the leaving of your
lands in the condition that they would have to be left
in?
A. I was quite willing to sell them this material,
for up to 56,000,000 yards, at two-tenths of a cent
a yard.

Q. Now you haven't answered my question. Did it
include both the digging of the dirtA. Well, for a hundred thousand dollars, Walt, yes.

Q. And you understood that wherever they dug this
topsoil out, thatA. That was my loss.

Q. That was your loss?
A. That's right.

Q. That would be part of the loss you would sustain?
A. That's right.

Q. And when you sized it all up in every way with
the loss taken into consideration · and the dirt they
would take out and the hole they would leave and the
compensation that you would get, you accepted it and
entered into the contract?
A. That's right.
MR. lvfANN: nNow for the purpose of the record
we object to the offer going in, plaintiff's exhibit eight,
or any testimony further in regard to price on this."
The court officially received it (Tr. 333 line 26):
nTHE COURT: Well, I guess to be consistent the
court should receive the contract, but I'm inclined to
sustain the objection now and let the case go forward.
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MR. O'CONER: You mean you're going to change
your ruling?
THE COURT: Well, the witness has testified to the
substance of the contract on cross examination. I want
to be consistent, though. I guess in fairness to your
side of the case I'd better receive the contract.',.
And the contract was received.
The case that had been cited was Weber County vs. Ritchie
et ux, 98 U. 272, 96 P2d 744, where it held, bottom left hand
column, page 746:
3, 4) Appellants offered in evidence the testimony
of another landowner of the vicinity. They sought to
prove the value of the Ritchie land taken by proving
what this other owner had received from the County
for his land for the same project. However, on voir dire
it was disclosed that the sum of money this landowner
received included damages to his remaining land. The
court ruled out the testimony of this witness upon the
ground that itwas not proper evidence of value. Under
the authorities we think this was correct. Although the
decisions divide upon the question of admissibility of
amounts paid by the condemnor for other lands, there
is little disagreement that compromise settlements, including damages, are not admissible. The proposed
testimony did not segregate the sale price from the
damages. It is questionable whether the price, had it
been segregated, would have been proper testimony
under the definition of market value as applicable to
condemnation proceedings. 18 Am. Jur., p. 996, Sec.
352 and cases cited thereunder. Generally see 118
A.L.R. 869, citing Telluride Power Co. v. Bruneau,
41, Utah 4, 125 P. 399, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1251 .."
n

(

It is beyond the writer's comprehension to understand
how attorney for appellant can, at this stage of the proceedings,
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after having his Exhibit No. 8 received as evidence, when a
recent Utah case was presented to the court, which, in effect,;
held that it was improper, can talk about prejudical error.
Particularly so when he offered no cases to the court in support'
of any of his contentions at the time of trial.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO THE JURY THE
QUESTION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES, AND BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN TESTIMONY
PERTAINING THERETO.

(a) THE FACTS OF THIS PARTICULAR CASE AND
THE PHYSICAL MAKEUP OF LITTLE VALLEY AND
ITS PARTICULAR USE IN CONNECTION WITH
DEFENDANTS' OTHER LANDS WAS PROOF OF
ITSELF THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER SIMILAR
LANDS AVAILABLE.
The writer agrees that Section 78-34-10 (2) U.C.A. 1953,
as set out by appellant in his brief is the statutory law governing what has been termed ((severance damages" and as a
consequence will not recopy the law.
In the statement of facts set out by the writer the Little
Valley itself was particular! y described because of its peculiar
make up, how it is used in the winter months (which are the
most hazardous to range livestock operations) which made
this part of the range belonging to respondents (with · their
established personal rights to the use of trails and roads up
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through the same when not on their own properties) exceptionally valuable to an owner. And that this was so whether
the owner operated his own operation or whether as in the
Hunter-Arthur case, they leased the same and were able to
demand and receive a good high rental for the use of this
valuable range.
The appellant dug a huge excavation across the lands of
respondents and the roadways and entrances into Little Valley
and on up into the Valley so as to actually create a barrier
and then it left that barrier forever for the livestockmen to
try and force their sheep or livestock around if they are to
utilize their lands that were not taken. They, by this taking,
created, or caused, damage to the remainder interest of the
respondents in this. 1,hey must put up with the hazards of
having their sheep stampeded or driven unintentionally with
sheep dogs (Tr. 164-38) over the steep banks and injured
or killed. They must put up with having the mother ewe
separated from the lamb as the sheep seek water (Tr. 163-2);
cave-ins, or the banks giving way (Tr. 165-14); working
with the livestock in the night time when it becomes necessary
(Tr. 165-21) around such a hazard; lambs playing in the
vicinity and going over the sides to destruction (Tr. 165-29);
and something unexpected that cannot be guarded against
spooking the sheep and possibly a thousand of them at once
going over the steep banks (Tr. 228-25). The hazard will
be there forever if the land is left like it is now (Tr. 166-27).
The severance damage that was done by appellant here
is not like the facts recited in the Provo River Water Users'
Assn. v~ Carlson, 133 P.2d 277. There they took the fee
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title as to a pasture of 18.75 acres of land that was _located
about a mile and a half away from the owner's other farm
property. Here they go right out in the middle of our holdings
and take what earth, gravel and fill material they want and
~amage the use of the remainder. Under Mr. O'Conner's
thinking, we had to show that there was no other land available to take the place of what they took. He forgets that
appellant did not take the fee title. Appellant only took
gravel fill and by doing so left a barrier right in the middle
of our holdings that damages the use of the rest. I just hope
he does not believe that we are under an obligation beforewe can obtain our severance damages to show that there is
not,~ other fill materials that we can buy with which to fill up
the hole. The application of the cases he cites is just about
that absurd, to the facts in this case. We must go on forever
paying taxes on this land that the diggings are on. Nothing
can replace it. It isn't the loss in feed that does the damage.
It is the cuts, the great excavations, the high banks, that were
not leveled out, the location of the same in that it goes from
one hill across the canyon to the other and on up through
the canyon so that livestock cannot naturally make use of
the owners' land. It makes the remaining lands actually of
less value, either from a use standpoint or a leasing standpoint. Consequently, unless the respondents are compensated
for this difference in value that was there before the taking
as compared after the taking, then the respondents will suffer
and will not receive compensation as contemplated by the
statutes of the State of Utah. The State v. Cooperative Security
Corp., of Church, 247 P.2d 269, has no application either to
the facts in this case, for the reasons set out above.
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(b) THE DAMAGES TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES WERE FROM APPELLANT'S
OPERATIONS UPON LANDS OWNED BY RESPONDENTS AND THEIR RIGHT OF ENTRY
THEREON.

(c) THE SO-CALLED {(SEVERANCE" DAMAGES
TESTIFIED TO BY RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES
CONSISTED OF DAMAGES THAT WOULD RESULT
TO AN OWNER IN THE USE OF HIS LAND IN
LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS OR TO AN OWNER IF
HE ATTEMPTED TO LEASE THE LANDS FOR A
LIVESTOCK OPERATION BY THE LANDS BEING
LESS DESIRABLE OR USEABLE TO A TENANT.

(e) RESPONDENTS DID PRESENT COMPETENT
EVIDENCE OF THE MARKET VALUE OF THEIR
REMAINING LANDS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN
DAMAGED.·
When this problem was approached in the course of the
trial, that is, what was Mr. Chournos testifying about when
he gave his opinion as to the loss the respondents HunterArthur would suffer? The matter was completely threshed
out and all agreed that it involved the Hunter-Arthur lands
only (Tr. 172 line 1-24).
Mr. Chournos later stated (Tr. 175-24):
nA. I figured I've been damaged the same amount
of money as the Sheehan people has."
Mr. Keller, a rancher with years of experience and who
at one time had all of the lands that are in coloring on the
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exhibit showing ownership, either as owner or lessee (T r.
221), was asked (Tr. 230-12):

ctQ. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not
the value of this land, for livestock operations, has
been reduced on account of the pits that have been
dug, in their present locale? I'm talking of the HunterArthur lease."
He gave his opinion (Tr. 232-4) that they would be reduced
in value in his opinion 25% or $1,750.00 per year and that
would be based on a twenty ( 20) year period.
There is another interesting thing that should be brought
to, the court's attention and that is that Mr. Adams, the chief
witness for the appellant, had the Hunter-Arthur lease at the
time of the hearing and testified that he ·would be willing
to renew it (Tr. 263-4) but it later developed, after he was
cross-examined, that he had been inconvenienced in his sheep
operation because of the railroad's operations and cuts (Tr.
277) and he admitted that the Southern Pacific had taken
care of him. The question was asked (Tr. 277-18):

'' Q. In other words, the Southern Pacific Railroad
considered that you and your leases and your operation
were injured because of the digging and so on up
through there.
A. Yes, sir."
And he admitted (Tr. 278-3) that they had paid him the
sum of $2,500.00 per year. He later said (Tr. 285-21) that
is what they gave him for disturbance and later said (Tr.
287-16) that it didn't cover acreage, it's the nuisance. Con·
sequently we get right down to this. He had the leases on
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the Hunter-Arthur lands. He had some lands of his own. He
couldn't run his sheep operation or enjoy the leases or the
fruits therefrom in the same manner that he had done before
the appellant came in to disrupt everything. The appellant,
through its engineer at the location of the project, recognized
the injury due to the taking and the resulting damage that was
caused to the lessee of the Hunter-Arthur people and as a
result paid him $2,500.00 annually over and above any sums
due by contract for the fill material. The damages testified to
by respondents' witnesses were not so great but the injury
will be forever the same.
Mr. O'Conner claims tha the damages as testified to cover
profits and/or losses to a business carried on, but we do not
interpret it as such. The loss of rental that would be suffered
yearly was converted to purchase price or market value by
formula (Tr. 232) over a twenty year period.
(d) RESPONDENTS' DAMAGES WERE NOT ARRIVED AT BY ADDING THE VALUES OF DIFFERENT USES FOR THE LAND TAKEN.
(f) THE TESTIMONY DOES ESTABLISH SEVERANCE DAMAGE OF RESPONDENTS' LANDS AS
THAT TERM IS CONTEMPLATED AND USED IN
THE COURT DECISIONS AND THE STATUTES.
The writer does not quarrel with the attorney for the
appellant on the law or what the cases he has presented
attempt to prove, but rather on his interpretation of the facts
of the case. We claim and I sincerely believe that the evidence
.proves that we are entitled to:
1
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1. The reasonable fair market value for the fill materials

taken.
2. We also claim that at the place appellan~s chose to

take the fill materials and from the manner in which they have
taken them, that they have rendered our remaining lands less
useful and as a consequence we have been damaged by the
lands remaining having a srnaller rea:sonable fair market
value, after the taking, than they had prior to the taking .
. We are not claiming loss of forage from the gravel pits.
If we did, then we would be claiming double damages. This
case is not one where the fee is taken, but one where the whole
face of the land is changed by the taking~
Our statute, in condemnation, is somewhat similar to the
California Code. In 10 Cal. Jur., page 340, we have:
nArticle 55. Damage to Property Not Taken:Where the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the compensation
to be awarded includes not only the value of the property taken but also the damages which will accrue to
the remainder by reason of its severance from the
portion sought and the construction of the improvement
in the manner proposed. So whatever tends directly
and substantiallv to diminish the value of the tract
left to the own~r should be weighed and considered
in awarding him damages. Thus it is proper to consider
such a depreciation in value as is caused by the enhanced danger of floods or seepage on the property
not taken from the manner of the use of the property
taken. And such damage may be considered as the
cutt~ng off fr.om a tract of streams or springs of water,
the 1nconven1ent form o.r shape of the remaining land
on account of the pubhc use, and other like injuries
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to the property not taken. It has been held that double
damages are not assessed against a condemning party
when the jury takes into consideration the value of
the land taken arising from its availability for use in
conjunction with the land not taken, and also the
damage caused to the land not taken by its availability
for use in con junction with the land taken." (See
numerous cases cited.)
CONCLUSION
It appears to the writer at the present time there are really
two judgments before the· court. One for the value of the
materials taken and one for the severance damages. It also
appears that this court may affirm both judgments, or may
affirm one and send one back, or may send both back.
We are now at the point in this condemnation proceedings
that has been promised that we would be in by counsel for the
appellant. That is, that if we didn't take its offer that any
judgment we might obtain would have to be supported by
Supreme Court decision. We, in turn, have advised it that
we were not afraid to present our case to the Supreme Court
in order to obtain our legal and equitable rights in this matter.
We further say, however, that the cost of these proceedings
are not as easily borne by us as they might be by the appellant.
That if the court should determine that any portion of the
matter should be tried over, then, I assume the court would
, sustain the balance of the judgment. This would then make
it possible for respondents to be compensated, and they would
then have the wherewith to carry on the fight. The record
: shows that appellant took possession October 22nd, 1957. Any
portion of this that might be retried will again have to go

a
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before two courts if we proceed on our past experience with
this appellant.
We sincerely believe, however, from the evidence presented, that we are entitled to the full amount as determined
by the jury and that the judgment of the lower court should
be sustained for the reasons set out in our brief.
Respectfully submitted,
1

WAL1 ER G. MANN,
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent
Helen Sheehan Arthur
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